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UNDERSTANDING PROPAGANDA 
by 
Maurice Tugwell 
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalien-
able Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness."1 
"Let the ruling class tremble at a communistic revolution. The 
proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world 
to win. Working men of all countries, unite!"2 
These two excerpts, one from the American Declaration of Independence, 
another from the Communist Manifesto, illustrate the importance of propa-
ganda in the service of revolution. They demonstrate too the neutrality of 
propaganda itself which, like a rifle or a warship, may be used for any cause, 
good, bad or indifferent. But, unlike most weapons, which inflict casualties and 
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damage and therefore tend to harden perceptions of good or evil, propaganda 
seeks to change such sentiments. It possesses a dimension which other weapon 
systems lack — the power to render an adversary harmless without resort to 
violence. This power can only rarely be brought to bear with full force and, 
since uncertainties complicate planning and worry commanders and staffs alike, 
the weapon called propaganda tends to be used mainly by those with no viable 
alternative — by the underdog, the weak, the revolutionary — and by those 
who, believing that God, history or some irresistible force is on their side, are 
willing to accept short-term uncertainties within the framework of their 
long-term confidence. 
In the liberal democracies, propaganda has a poor reputation. It is associated 
in many minds with deliberate distortion of facts, with brain-washing and totali-
tarianism. Dame Freya Stark, the travel-writer who worked for British propa-
ganda during World War II, remarked that "the main obstacle was the unfor-
tunate word propaganda itself. When first adopted by the Church of Rome it 
was simply used in the gospel sense of the spreading of a faith, until a reputation 
for subtlety whether or not deserved gave it a new and sinister twist of deceit. 
Two opposed ideas, the truth and the hiding of truth, thus became sheathed in 
one term, and have shuffled promiscuously inside it ever since."3 
To overcome such reservations, Western nations have tended to abandon the 
word propaganda when describing their own efforts in the field, and to reserve 
it for hostile appeals. Internally, our attempts to mold public opinion are often 
referred to as "information", while against an adversary we use "psychological 
operations"4 or "political warfare"5. These evasions are not simply inspired by 
liberal squeamishness. They acknowledge, albeit indirectly, the dangerous side 
effects of propaganda for democracy. In the modern age, when the means of 
communicating and influencing opinion are so widespread, sophisticated and 
powerful, any nation which indulges in full-scale, long-term propaganda 
activities places its democratic credentials at risk. Like total war, total propa-
ganda is a totalitarian force.6 This poses severe problems for the West. 
Propaganda in History 
There is nothing new about propaganda. Four centuries before Christ, the 
Indian minister Kautilya recommended psychological action to strengthen 
loyalty at home, to earn the support of neutrals, and to promote rebellion in the 
enemy state.7 The Greek philosopher Plato imagined an ideal city state 
governed by an elite group known as the guardians, whose "divine" right to 
rule would be underpinned by the mass indoctrination of one "Noble Lie". 
Lying was to be the prerogative of government: mothers were to tell their 
children only authorised stories, music was to be censored and drama banned.8 
The Chinese strategist Sun Tzu advised that enemies could be weakened by 
encouraging dissipation of wealth, by sending women and boys to befuddle 
leaders, by manipulating character defects — particularly pride — and by creat-
ing anxiety over constant casualties. "Generally in war," he wrote, "the best 
policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior . . . to subdue the enemy 
without fighting is the acme of skill."9 In 1622 the word "propaganda" was 
coined in a Papal Bull setting up a committee of cardinals to supervise foreign 
missions — the Congregatio de Propaganda Fide — charged with converting 
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the "heathen masses of the Americas, and the protestant populations of 
Europe".10 
The revolutionary movements of the 18th Century showed the importance of 
propaganda in mobilizing the mass, an importance that would increase with the 
universal franchise, literacy, mass communications and the "age of the common 
man". In World War I the warring nations were subjected to intensive propa-
ganda, which kept many men fighting under conditions which might otherwise 
have been unendurable. Some historians believe that the United States internal 
propaganda directed by George Creel pushed that nation dangerously towards 
totalitarianism. In Russia, however, internal propaganda failed. First the Czar 
was overthrown and then, aided by the Germans, Bolshevik revolutionaries 
were able to undermine military discipline, mobilize vital segments of the 
population, seize power by coup and consolidate it by force. 
By World War II the special power of revolutionary propaganda had been 
harnessed by Nazi Germany and lesser fascist states, as well as by the USSR, and 
the war was begun under competing ideological banners. The Soviets found 
that communist propaganda failed to unify or inspire their people and switched 
in haste to nationalism as an integrating force. This was effective, and ever since 
1945 the USSR has sought to enlist Russian patriotism in support of socialist 
ideology when times are hard. Opposing the generally perceived evil of fascism, 
the democracies succeeded in mobilizing national wills without recourse to the 
crass demonology of the first world war. Few who witnessed the second war, 
however, failed to be impressed by the German capacity for resistance even 
after all reasonable hope of victory had gone, and we may conclude that the 
union of national pride and revolutionary fervour that Nazi propaganda 
promoted unleashed potent psychological forces. 
Since 1945 much political propaganda has followed the Nazi pattern, even 
when in the service of causes far removed from that ideology. The pan-Arab 
nationalism of Nasser, militant Zionism, the crusading Castroite liberators, and 
the struggles by colonized people for self-determination used a combination of 
nationalism and political idealism to inspire the faithful. In China, Mao's 
revolution followed more closely the strictly communist formula, which is 
supposed to subordinate nationalism to the new international order, but in later 
days the Sino-Soviet dispute has exposed the resilence of nationalism even 
within this new order. Often, nationalist propaganda has employed Marxist 
techniques and rhetoric, just as communist revolutionaries have sometimes 
concealed their ideology behind nationalist facades because of the latter's wider 
appeal. Strong revolutionary propaganda contains the seeds of the integration 
propaganda which will be needed to unify the country in the aftermath of 
battle. The Chinese communists were much more successful in this transition 
than their Russian predecessors. Integration propaganda ought to enable the 
new regime to rule with sufficient consensus that coercion is scarcely needed. 
The failure of communism in the USSR to achieve consensus, and its later 
failure in the occupied countries of Eastern Europe to inspire anything more 
positive than hate and despair, denotes the shortcomings both of the ideology 
and its propaganda, which to all intents and purposes are the same thing." 
Internally, we may say that the Russian revolution is sick. 
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Yet, paradoxically, external Soviet propaganda is alive and well.Marxist-
Leninism has yet to prove that it can deliver its supposed advantages to people 
under its control. But so attractive are those advantages, when seen from afar 
and taken at face value, that the glittering generalities (to use a technical propa-
ganda term) of communism retain a powerful revolutionary utility in the world. 
It is not the sole source. Recent events in Iran have shown the power of militant 
Islam. From the have-nots of the world, the victims of the so-called North-South 
confrontation, we can hear the beginnings of a new revolutionary rhetoric, one 
that may overwhelm our children if we turn a deaf ear. And let us not overlook 
our own, unstructured but remarkably powerful propaganda, which takes the 
form of ideas, deeds, examples — the improvised propaganda of democracy and 
free enterprise. 
Organization 
To be really effective, that is to say to cause its subjects to act in accordance 
with the sponsor's wishes, propaganda needs organization. If the action 
obtained is to be productive, it must be collective. Coordination can only be 
achieved through organization. Yet, within the group, propaganda operates 
against the "individual in the mass", by surrounding him, isolating him, and 
playing upon his individual emotions. Belonging to the group makes the 
individual feel stronger, but in reality he is weakened because he dare not speak 
or act outside group attitudes. This makes him susceptible to any message 
emanating within the organization, and immune to other appeals. Although we 
may think of the Hitler Youth Movement or Komsomol as typical examples of 
organization, nearer home the street gang, labour union or elite military unit 
provides similar conditions. 
Propaganda and organization can lead their subjects to act in accordance with 
the sponsor's desires, and such actions in turn cement the individual to the 
group and its propaganda. Once a new member has been persuaded to act out-
side the norms of his background, family and previous associates, he cannot 
easily turn back. He is committed. Moreover, because he may feel uneasy about 
what he has done, whether this be an act of betrayal, or something unlawful, or 
merely behaviour outside his previous experience, he or she needs more propa-
ganda to justify the past and inspire the future act. 
Operations 
Propaganda works well if it builds on existing attitudes and sociological 
trends. These can easily be modified, directed and sharpened to the sponsor's 
advantage, and subjects will readily act in accordance with the sponsor's 
strategy. The current concern in the West over environmental issues has its roots 
in apolitical sociological propaganda. Radicals who infiltrated the movement 
succeeded to some degree in using it for political purposes, without rank and file 
environmentalists being aware of what was happening. Soviet propaganda has 
supported this move, claiming that capitalist countries are responsible for pollu-
tion, while the communist bloc "devote great attention in the sphere of the 
environment" — another glittering generality.12 From environmental concern 
to anti-nuclear energy to anti-nuclear armaments to unilateral disarmament to 
"peace", the skilful propagandist can hope to modify and redirect the public's 
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legitimate concerns until, in the Soviet vision of peace, Marxist-Leninists govern 
the world. 
In contrast, propaganda which tries to oppose fundamental trends and 
attitudes in the society in which it acts is likely to fail. Any propaganda needs 
time: its psychological action has to be lasting and continuous if it is to have the 
desired effect. However, to attack fundamental attitudes head on may take for-
ever, and for that reason this approach is generally avoided. Propaganda must 
be consistent with visible facts, upon certain of which it must pronounce judge-
ment. Without facts, propaganda has little strength. Despite all technique, the 
art remains uncertain. No one can be absolutely sure how audiences will 
respond. Propaganda, strong within the group and effective beyond the group 
amongst the domestic audience, becomes weak when addressed to a foreign 
country or enemy. Psychological action can only be fully effective in the hands 
of nationals addressing fellow citizens. 
This last characteristic may seem at odds with the assertion made earlier, that 
Soviet propaganda to the outside world was alive and well. The reason why 
communist propaganda succeeds in the Third World and in the West is that it 
uses national parties, front organizations, agents of influence, news media assets 
under covert Soviet control, and other "local" means to overcome the problem 
of separation. Few North Americans, for instance, listen to Radio Moscow or 
read Pravda.and those who do are apt to become bored. However, many may 
hear and see Soviet propaganda dressed up as news, information, education and 
culture every day of their lives, delivered in forms which do not betray their 
origin or subversive purpose. Recent Soviet successes in the United Nations may 
exclude Western television, radio and news agencies from much of the Third 
World, leaving audiences there more receptive of communist propaganda.13 
Climates of Opinion 
Outside the organized group of ideologically committed activists, all of whom 
will act at the sponsor's command, propaganda's chief function is to alter the 
climate of opinion in society at large. By climate of opinion we mean the totality 
of opinions, knowledge, values and behaviour which, for a certain period and at 
a certain place, either must be displayed publicly by members of a society in 
order not to become isolated, or may be displayed publically without risk of 
isolation from the other members of society. The term is appropriate because 
climate is something external which nevertheless strongly influences our inner 
beings by its condition and variability.14 Climates of opinion are created by a 
variety of influences. Without interference, sociological propaganda, that force 
by which any society seeks to integrate the maximum number of individuals 
into itself and to spread its style of life, would be the main architect of the 
climate of opinion. Fashions, fads, crazes and vogues are the creatures of socio-
logical propaganda, prodded perhaps by commercial interests, and these make 
it impossible, for instance, for a woman to wear last year's dress length without 
risk of isolation. More profound aspects of the climate affect our feelings 
towards women's rights, blacks, big business, and of course the environment. 
One has only to cast the mind back ten or fifteen years to appreciate how 
changed are the attitudes that may safely be aired publicly on these and other 
issues. If opinions cannot be uttered without risk of social isolation, few ordinary 
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people and fewer still politicians are likely to say them. Thus the climate of 
opinion limits our thoughts and our actions within precisely defined boundaries. 
This may leave the way clear for the agent of influence to direct events in a 
manner desired by his sponsor. 
Facts 
Facts are so important to effective propaganda, particularly in free societies 
where people have scope to investigate, that their presentation, and in some 
instances their creation, lies at the centre of this form of communication. The 
nineteenth century terrorists realised this, and coined the phrase "Propaganda 
of the Deed" to describe acts of violence designed to influence the mass through 
the indirect psychological impact of the deed. Modern communications have 
multiplied the effectiveness of this method and television has elevated the visual 
symbol high above the spoken or written word in the struggle for men's minds. 
Thus public opinion forms itself around those images which are available to 
news cameramen to record and which are selected for broadcasting by the 
producers and editors. By its nature, this medium will always give priority to 
stories which are visually dramatic. The skilful propagandist can capitalize on 
this tendency, as coverage of the Vietnam war showed. 
Facts can sometimes be created by the method known to the Russians as 
Dezinformatsiya — disinformation. According to a KGB training manual, 
"strategic disinformation assists in the execution of State tasks, and is directed 
at misleading the enemy concerning the basic questions of State policy...'"5 Just 
as, in war, the Western powers used deception operations to mislead Nazi 
Germany on such vital matters as the place and date of the invasion of France, 
so, in the on-going war called peace, the USSR works hard to deceive the West. 
Sometimes this deception is aimed directly at the elites, through agents of 
influence, traitors in high places, etc.: more often, it is directed at the news 
media, opinion-formers and the general public. Here again, the objective is to 
create a climate of opinion in which it is politically impossible for the govern-
ment to adopt policies which might hinder the USSR in the "execution of State 
tasks".16 One disinformation method is the forged document, which provides as 
it were the speck of grit around which the pearl of propaganda can form. When 
in June 1980 the Iranian authorities cited an alleged confidential memorandum 
on White House stationery from Zbigniew Brzezinski to Cyrus Vance, they 
presumably knew that the "fact" they were revealing would make "news" in the 
west and thus influence target audiences which might have ignored a plain state-
ment from Iranian sources.17 
Another, more advanced, disinformation technique is to conjure the facts into 
existence. Perhaps the most common example is the creation of conditions in which 
law enforcement agencies have to arrest struggling protestors in the full glare of 
the news media. If the protestors are youthful boys and girls, unarmed and 
apparently defenceless, and the police wear riot gear, helmets and visors, and 
carry clubs, the pictures that the public will see will tend to discredit the forces of 
law and order. If the protestors struggle, hurl rocks or fight with improvised 
weapons, the pictorial coverage will almost certainly feature the upraised baton 
of a burly police officer, civilian casualties and other symbols of repression. 
Casting our minds back half a century, we should remember the Reichstag fire, 
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which provided an excuse for the persecution of Jews and communists, and was 
a classic example of disinformation. 
Deception 
Propaganda that acknowledges its source is known as "white", that which 
does not specifically identify any sponsor is "grey", and "black propaganda" is 
a message which purports to emanate from a source other than the true one. As 
an example of "black", we recall Sefton Delmer's World War II bogus German 
army "underground" radio broadcasts, which seemed to be the work of disil-
lusioned army officers but in reality were beamed from England, using high-
grade intelligence material to provide apparent authenticity.18 In the permanent 
struggle of Marxist-Leninism all shades of propaganda can be identified. With 
easy access to the target countries it is unnecessary for the sponsor to rely on 
technology to penetrate and mislead: one well-placed, greedy or "committed" 
journalist can be fed high-grade intelligence material selected for its power to 
embarrass authority and disillusion the public. He will be applauded as a fear-
less investigative journalist and few will suspect the "black" origins of his 
stories. Moreover he will gain in professional stature if he steadfastly refuses to 
disclose his sources. The shade of propaganda has nothing to do with its 
veracity. Indeed, the blacker the source, the greater the need for verifiable 
accuracy. 
Although correct or at least credible facts are usually essential, this does not 
rob the propagandist of the opportunity to deceive. Untruths enter the system 
through the intentions that are attributed and the interpretations offered. 
Western and Soviet commentators are agreed that Russian troops entered 
Afghanistan in the closing days of 1979. One side interprets this as military 
aggression, the other, as fraternal assistance. 
Although as a general rule it is best, and safest, to build propaganda upon 
verifiable facts, there are occasions when the unscrupulous can benefit by bending 
this rule. One example is the long-term forecast. It is quite safe for Soviet 
leaders to assure audiences of better harvests, more food, adequate housing and 
plentiful consumer goods in say, ten years time. No one inside the system will 
dare expose the lie when the promises are broken, and in the unlikely event that 
someone in the West bothers to uncover the deception, he is unlikely to reach a 
Soviet audience. Another use is more dangerous, but may sometimes be una-
voidable. This is the lie that is necessary to support a false interpretation. In 
1968 the Czechs were drifting away from communist orthodoxy: that was a 
fact. The Warsaw Pact armies were entering that country to stop the drift: that 
too was a fact. The interpretations offered by the Soviet propagandists alleged 
that the Dubcek government was under foreign influence and was acting against 
the wishes of the population. Both were lies of interpretation but the latter was 
also a denial of verifiable fact. Ideologically, the theme could not be changed, 
since at the root of all totalitarian systems there is the primacy of ideology over 
empirical fact, yet the truth was there for all to see. The real hostility of the 
Czech people to the invasion of their territory and the destruction of their bid 
for partial independence so affected the Soviet occupation troops that summary 
executions of disaffected soldiers ran into dozens. Most divisions that took part 
in the invasion had to be removed from Czechoslovakia because their morale 
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and political reliability were shaken. This event exposed a weakness in the 
Soviet system that might be exploited. 
Then there is the lie that brings such enormous short-term gains that any later 
embarrassment can be accepted. Of course if time and circumstances allow, 
such an invention would be made plausible by disinformation but, however it is 
handled, it aims to resolve a crisis to the sponsor's benefit. Lies of this sort have 
accompanied almost every border violation in history — "the Poles/ 
Norwegians/Dutch/Belgians/Yugoslavs/Greeks/etc. fired on our border guards/ 
invaded Germany/shelled our troops/etc." These are the routine variety. More 
important are the lies which, for instance, use "black" techniques to allege that 
the target nation's government is suing for peace and has ordered all troops to 
lay down their arms, or that the royal family, accompanied by harem and gold, 
is about to depart in its fleet of private Boeing 747s. It really does not matter to 
the sponsor if future historians of the battle expose these lies: if the battle ends in 
one day with scarcely any casualties or damage, such lies can even be justified. 
Sometimes the lie can be insinuated simply by stretching a point, or by 
mistake. Writing in The Washington Post " in October, 1980, William Greider 
alleged: "The Russian tank is crude and simple compared to our million-dollar 
electronic marvels", a view that has no foundation in fact, and he used this argu-
ment to disparage "the cold warriors" (a Soviet propaganda phrase) for "the 
new hysteria over national defense". Later in the same article Greider listed 
Soviet security problems and included "the new tactical nukes in Germany that 
threaten from the West", even though he must presumably have known that 
none has yet been deployed, and none is likely to be in place before 1983. 
Reluctance to use untruths springs, of course, from a fear of being found out, 
with damage to one's credibility. The necessity is often turned into a virtue by 
attributing it to moral restraint, but experience suggests that whenever the 
chance of detection is small, propagandists will not hesitate to use falsehood. 
British propaganda in World War I was a case in point. One reason why the lie 
is never likely to be completely abandoned as a weapon in this form of conflict is 
the public's lasting preference for the first story which is published, particularly 
if it is made attractive by sensation, and more particularly if it is what people 
want to believe. Not without good reason did Britain's former Prime Minister, 
James Callaghan, complain: "a lie can be half way round the world before 
truth has got its boots on".20 
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PROBLEMS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S DEFENCE 
by 
Reginald H. Roy and Paul Moorcraft 
"The dark clouds rolling towards South Africa pose a threat that makes 
essential the transition from a prosperous society to one that is geared for 
survival."1 So spoke General Magnus Malan, the recently retired head of the 
South African Defence Force in February, 1977. Other senior officers have 
echoed these words, but the Republic's military men are less dramatic than their 
political leaders who promise, if provoked, to fight "until the blood rises to the 
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